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 Th e Metaphilosophy of Language* 
 Daniel  Cohnitz 
 1. Th e dilemma of metaphilosophy 
 Within the fi eld of philosophy, metaphilosophy has moved to the centre of 
attention in the past decade. 1 Th is development was in part provoked by the 
rise of experimental philosophy as an alleged alternative to standard armchair 
philosophy. 
 Of course, the fact that methodological questions in philosophy are now 
assessed more systematically than they were in the past 2 is a positive development. 
However, some of the discussions between methodological conservatives and 
experimental revolutionists appear to be surprisingly naïve. Typically, it seems 
to be assumed, on both sides of the debate, that there is such a thing as a general 
methodology of philosophy, which can be discussed and assessed without paying 
attention to the peculiarities of the diff erent sub-disciplines of philosophy. 
 But it is easy to show that this is not a terribly plausible assumption. 
Methodological questions arise relative to the aims or goals one has set for 
oneself. Th ey are questions of the type “What is the best way to do X?” But it 
isn’t clear at all that all areas of philosophy plausibly involve the same X here at 
any (even minimally) interesting level of abstraction. Let’s take a look why this 
might be so. Perhaps the best candidate for philosophy’s general goal is to fi nd 
the truth. Aft er all, philosophy is a compound of φιλεῖν and σοφία and translates 
as Love of Wisdom, so shouldn’t we conceive of philosophy’s aim in general as 
cognitive? 
 First of all, it is not clear that it is even true that all philosophy aims at truth. 
Is practical philosophy, ethics in particular, an attempt to discover moral truth? 
If you are a non-cognitivist about ethics, you will dispute such an assumption. 
Moreover, ethics isn’t the only area in which a non-cognitivist attitude can make 
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sense. For example, all areas of philosophy that conceive of their enterprise as one 
of providing explications in Rudolf Carnap’s (1950) sense of the word, the aim 
of philosophical inquiry might rather be seen as the development of normative 
proposals (e.g. proposals to use certain concepts in certain refi ned ways). 
 Second, even if we agreed that at least large parts of philosophy aim at truth 
and knowledge, it isn’t clear that ‘truth and knowledge’ alone characterize an 
aim that could determine a specifi c methodology. Diff erent kinds of truths 
might require diff erent methods for their discovery. Is our epistemic access to 
metaphysical truths the same as our access to conceptual or logical truth? Th ose 
who hold on to an analytic/synthetic distinction might doubt that it is. Logical 
truth is perhaps plausibly accessible a priori, but at least some metaphysical 
truths might be only a posteriori knowable. 
 Rejecting the a priori/a posteriori distinction improves the situation only 
slightly. Sociology, linguistics, history, particle physics and astronomy are all a 
posteriori disciplines, but they have very diff erent methodologies that display 
similarities only on a very high level of abstraction. Th e reason for this is that 
their subject matter and our epistemic access to that subject matter are very 
diff erent, even if this access is in all cases a posteriori. 
 It seems that in order to argue for a general methodology for philosophy as 
a whole, one would fi rst need to answer a number of substantial philosophical 
questions in specifi c ways. Are moral questions cognitive? Are there metaphysical 
truths that are only a posteriori knowable? Is logic a priori? Are there any 
analytic truths that are knowable on the basis of linguistic competence alone? 
When dealing with questions like these, one is already engaging with central 
topics in fi rst-order philosophy, one is already doing philosophy. But how can 
one hope to formulate a methodology of philosophy, if that presupposes answers 
to questions like these? 
 In this chapter, I will use the example of philosophy of language, and in 
particular the recent debate concerning the role of intuitions in choosing between 
alternative theories of reference, to demonstrate which specifi c assumptions and 
considerations enter into methodological discussion. Th ough, as we will see, 
these assumptions can’t plausibly be generalized to other areas of philosophical 
inquiry. 3 
 In Section 2, I will begin with a short summary of the methodological 
discussion concerning the role of intuitions in philosophy of language, which 
developed in response to empirical results by experimental philosophers that 
seemed to indicate a certain cross-cultural variability in intuitions about the 
reference of proper names. One central question in this debate is which and 
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whose intuitions should count in the fi rst place for theory choice on the standard 
account that experimental philosophers intend to criticize. As we will see, the 
experimental philosophers as well as many of their critics seem to assume that 
the relevant intuitions are certain metalinguistic judgements the reliability of 
which depends on how correctly they inform us about an independent realm of 
objective semantic facts. 
 Th is realm of semantic fact that a theory of reference is supposed to describe 
will be the topic of the third section. How should we conceive of the subject 
matter of theories of reference? Are these semantic facts indeed independent 
of the intuitive interpretation and production of linguistic items by competent 
speakers? I will argue that this assumption would be very implausible and at odds 
with the explanatory aim of philosophical semantics, namely to make a systematic 
contribution to the explanation of successful linguistic communication. Far from 
being independent of the intuitive interpretation and production of linguistic 
items by competent speakers, the realm of semantic facts is instead constituted 
by it. 
 Section 4 will discuss how the judgements that seem to play a methodological 
role in the standard methodology of philosophy of language relate to the 
intuitive interpretation and production of linguistic items by competent 
speakers. I will argue that these judgements are best understood as reports of 
intuitive interpretations or productions. Th us the question of how reliable these 
judgements are is a question of how reliably they report what they are supposed 
to report. As we will see, there are good  prima facie reasons to assume that these 
reports are reliable. 
 However, since the reliability of these reports is ultimately an empirical 
question, Section 5 will sketch how some methods of psycholinguistics could be 
used to determine their actual reliability empirically. 
 In the sixth and last section, the results of the discussion of this example will 
be summarized and the extent to which the results reached can be generalized 
will be discussed. I will argue that the generalizability of these results is very 
limited and probably doesn’t go beyond philosophy of language (and even within 
philosophy of language, they don’t generalize to all topics or questions). 
 2. Th e experimentalist challenge 
 It is probably fair to say that the recent discussion concerning the role of intuitions 
in philosophy of language started with the publication of the provocative 
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paper “Semantics, Cross-cultural Style” by Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, 
Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich (2004). 4 In the paper the authors provide 
reconstructions of two families of theories of reference; that is, theories that are 
supposed to explain how certain linguistic expressions (e.g. proper names) refer 
to objects in the world. Th e two families distinguished are descriptivist theories 
of reference (characterized by D1 and D2) and causal-historical theories of 
reference (characterized by C1 and C2): 
 Descriptivist View 
 D1. Competent speakers associate a description with every proper name. Th is 
description specifi es a set of properties. 
 D2. An object is the referent of a proper name if and only if it uniquely or 
best satisfi es the description associated with it. An object uniquely satisfi es a 
description when the description is true of it and only it. If no object entirely 
satisfi es the description, many philosophers claim that the proper name refers to 
the unique individual that satisfi es most of the description . . . If the description 
is not satisfi ed at all or if many individuals satisfy it, the name does not refer. 
 (Machery et al. 2004, B2) 
 Causal-Historical View 
 C1. A name is introduced into a linguistic community for the purpose of 
referring to an individual. It continues to refer to that individual as long as its 
uses are linked to the individual via a causal chain of successive users: every 
user of the name acquired it from another user, who acquired it in turn from 
someone else, and so on, up to the fi rst user who introduced the name to refer 
to a specifi c individual. 
 C2. Speakers may associate descriptions with names. Aft er a name is introduced, 
the associated description does not play any role in the fi xation of the referent. 
Th e referent may entirely fail to satisfy the description. 
 (Machery et al. 2004, B2–B3) 
 Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich claim that in philosophy theories are chosen 
if they accord with the intuitions of philosophers when evaluating actual and 
hypothetical cases in the domain of these theories and theories are rejected if 
their predictions are in confl ict with the intuitive judgements of philosophers. 
Also in the choice between these two families of theories of reference, a choice 
was made based on such intuitive judgements. In particular, Saul Kripke had 
described hypothetical cases in  Naming and Necessity (1980), the intuitive 
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evaluation of which was compatible with the predictions of a causal-historical 
theory but contradicted the predictions of descriptivist theories. 
 Inspired by previous research on cultural variation in cognitive strategies 
between Westerners (Ws) and East Asians (EAs) (c.f. Nisbett et al. 2001; Nisbett 
2003), as well as results about cultural variation (between the same groups) in 
intuitive judgements about thought experiments in epistemology (Weinberg 
et al. 2001), Machery et al. conjectured that a similar cultural variation should 
also be found for the hypothetical cases described by Kripke. Th us, their paper 
describes two experiments intended to test the following hypothesis:
 When presented with Kripke-style thought experiments, Ws would be more 
likely to respond in accordance with causal-historical accounts of reference, 
while EAs would be more likely to respond in accordance with descriptivist 
accounts of reference. 
 (Machery et al. 2004, B5) 
 In order to test this hypothesis Machery et al. formulate four vignettes featuring 
hypothetical cases that are modelled aft er the cases discussed by Kripke. One of 
these, the so-called ‘Gödel/Schmidt-case’, reads as follows: 
 Suppose that John has learned in college that Gödel is the man who proved 
an important mathematical theorem, called the incompleteness of arithmetic. 
John is quite good at mathematics and he can give an accurate statement of the 
incompleteness theorem, which he attributes to Gödel as the discoverer. But this 
is the only thing that he has heard about Gödel. Now suppose that Gödel was not 
the author of this theorem. A man called “Schmidt”, whose body was found in 
Vienna under mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the work 
in question. His friend Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and claimed 
credit for the work, which was thereaft er attributed to Gödel. Th us, he has been 
known as the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. Most people 
who have heard the name “Gödel” are like John; the claim that Gödel discovered 
the incompleteness theorem is the only thing they have ever heard about Gödel. 
When John uses the name “Gödel”, is he talking about:
 (A) the person who really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic? or 
 (B) the person who got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work? 
 (Machery et al. 2004, B6) 
 Vignettes like this were presented to undergraduate students from Rutgers 
University and the University of Hong Kong. In response to vignettes modelled 
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aft er the Gödel/Schmidt-case, about two-thirds of the Ws chose answer (B), 
while only about one-third of the EAs chose that answer. 
 Machery et al. draw far-reaching conclusions from this result. In (Machery 
et al. 2004) they argue that philosophers of language should reconsider their 
methodology. In a later paper (Mallon et al. 2009) the same authors argue that 
theorizing about reference should be abandoned completely, since there seem 
to be no viable methodological alternatives. In other places, experimental 
philosophers argue that these experiments show that the standard methodology 
of analytic philosophy (viz. the consideration of hypothetical cases in theory 
choice) is ‘bankrupt’. 5 
 Th ese radical claims about philosophy as a whole, and the methodology of 
philosophy of language in particular, provoked a lively debate. In this debate we 
fi nd two sets of objections against the argumentation by Machery et al. One set 
objects to the analysis of standard methodology by Machery et al. Th e other set 
objects to details of the experiment:
 1.  Objections to the characterization of standard methodology 
 1.1  Intuitions don’t play the special role in philosophy that experimental 
philosophers assign to it. In particular, intuitions aren’t the foundation 
for philosophical arguments. Th erefore the empirical investigation 
of the possible cultural variation of intuitions is simply irrelevant for 
philosophical methodology. (Cappelen 2012) 
 1.2  Even if the intuitive evaluation of the Gödel/Schmidt-case played 
some role, Kripke presented many more arguments in  Naming and 
Necessity which were much more relevant and signifi cant and which 
are independent of intuitive judgements about hypothetical cases. 
(Deutsch 2009, 2011a; Martí 2014) 6 
 1.3  Th e intuitions of laymen shouldn’t play a role in the evaluation of 
theories of reference. If intuitions should be given an evidential role, 
then it’s the intuitions of experts, that is, professional philosophers of 
language and perhaps linguists. (Devitt 2011a) 7 
 2.  Objections to Details of the Experiment 
 2.1  Th e result of the experiment can’t inform us about variation in the 
relevant intuitions, since the answers (A) and (B) were formulated 
as metalinguistic judgements. However, that people diff er in their 
metalinguistic judgements was obvious from the start. Aft er all that is 
why there are two diff erent families of theories of reference. (Martí 2009, 
2014) 8 
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 2.2  Th e result of the experiment can’t inform us about variation in the 
relevant intuitions, because the question at the end of the vignette 
contains an ambiguity, which can account for the variation in answers. 
“Who John is talking about” can either mean the speaker meaning 
(who does John intend to talk about?) or the semantic referent (what 
does “Gödel” refer to in John’s utterance?). (Deutsch 2009; Sytsma and 
Livengood 2011) 9 
 Th e dissimilitude of these objections already indicates that there is no consensus 
within philosophy of language on whether semantic intuitions (should) play a 
signifi cant role, and if so, which and whose intuitions are of relevance. Objection 
1.1 denies the relevance of intuitions completely. 1.3 denies the relevance of 
intuitions of laymen. 2.1 seems to allow intuitions some role but objects that the 
experiment tested the wrong ones. 
 Which out of these objections are valid and which should be rejected? As 
explained in the introduction, methodological questions depend on one’s aims. 
Th us, in order to see what role intuitions should play in our methodology, we 
should fi rst get clear on what purpose theories of reference are supposed to have. 
Th is question will be discussed in the next section. Only aft er that will Section 4 
turn to the question of which and whose intuitions (if any) should be of relevance 
in choosing between diff erent theories of reference. 
 3. Meta-Internalism vs. Meta-Externalism 
 Th e two families of theories of reference that were introduced in section 2 (viz. 
descriptivist theories and causal-historical theories) are oft en also classifi ed as 
“internalist” or “externalist” theories of reference, respectively. A descriptive 
theory is internalist in this sense because what a proper name in a certain 
speaker’s usage refers to depends partly on her internal states (because it depends 
on which description, or bundle of descriptions, the speaker associates with the 
name). A causal-historical theory, in contrast, is externalist in this sense because 
it depends solely on the existence of a causal chain of name-borrowing between 
language users that determines what a name refers to, regardless of the speaker’s 
awareness of that chain. 
 In order to clarify which kind of evidence matters for deciding between these 
two kinds of theories, we should fi rst inquire into which kinds of facts it could 
depend on, that is, whether an internalist or an externalist theory is true. When 
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we know this, we can inquire into what is the best way (or at least a good way) 
to fi nd out about these facts. 
 As argued in (Cohnitz and Haukioja 2013), we can make progress on the fi rst 
question by also drawing a distinction between internalism and externalism at 
a meta-level. We should then distinguish between Meta-Internalism and Meta-
Externalism: 
 Meta-Internalism : How a linguistic expression E in an utterance U by a speaker 
S refers and which theory of reference is true of E is determined by individual 
psychological states of S at the time of U. 
 Meta-Externalism : How a linguistic expression E in an utterance U by a speaker S 
refers and which theory of reference is true of E is independent of the individual 
psychological states of S at the time of U. 
 Many theories of reference are meta-internalist: that the referent of, say, a proper 
name is a matter of the history of its usage within in the linguistic community is 
usually (though oft en not explicitly) considered to be so because the speaker in 
using the name had the (tacit) intention to engage in that tradition of reference 
borrowing. Th us, on this account, reference is determined via external factors 
(the history and tradition of using the name) but that it is these external factors 
is determined by the (tacit) intentions of the speaker. 
 On a meta-externalist view, it could be that, even if the speaker had no 
such intentions, nonetheless the reference of proper names in her usage could 
be determined by the way the name is used in the tradition of her linguistic 
community, because it is external factors (independent of her intentions, or 
dispositions or other psychological states) that determine which fi rst-order 
theory is true of linguistic expressions in her usage. 
 Hence in this case, semantic facts are independent of the internal facts of 
speakers, including their dispositions to produce and interpret expressions in 
certain ways and, consequently, independent of the intuitions speakers might have 
concerning the semantic properties of the expressions they use. Th us, if we assume 
that a speaker’s intuitive judgements in response to Gödel/Schmidt-cases reveal 
her dispositions concerning how she’d use or interpret a certain type of expression 
(an assumption we will scrutinize below), it would be possible that her judgements 
just don’t track the semantic facts (although they’d track her linguistic dispositions). 
Hence, the meta-externalist response to the found variation between Ws and EAs 
would be that at least one of the groups is getting the semantic facts wrong. On that 
account, semantic facts are as independent of intuitions as physical facts are. Th is 
view seems 10 to have obvious methodological consequences. Just as we shouldn’t 
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have much trust in our intuitions when it comes to matters of physics, we shouldn’t 
have much trust in our intuitions when it comes to semantics. 
 One philosopher who seems to hold such a meta-externalist view is Michael 
Devitt. Devitt argues that the subject matter of semantics and linguistics is 
‘linguistic reality’, the study of physical expression tokens and their semantic and 
grammatical properties (Devitt 2006). Th is reality should be distinguished from 
psychological reality. How the expression tokens get their properties seems to 
be a secondary question for him, and he allows that expression tokens get their 
semantic properties independently of the psychological states of the speaker at 
the time of the relevant utterance. 
 Other, perhaps clearer, examples of meta-externalist positions are theories of 
reference that assume that objective structures (for example, natural properties) 
can function as reference magnets for a speaker’s expressions and thereby 
override the intentions of the speaker that pertain to the speaker’s use of a term 
in her repertoire (including the absence of any intentions to use it for whatever 
the objective structures happen to be). 11 
 Although meta-externalism seems to be endorsed by some radical fi rst-
order externalists, it is a rather implausible position. As argued in Cohnitz and 
Haukioja (2013), it leads to the possibility of ‘semantic secrets’ 12 ; expressions 
might (systematically) ‘refer’ to objects that are irrelevant to the contents 
transmitted in communication. But if that can happen, then a theory of reference 
wouldn’t systematically contribute to an explanation of successful linguistic 
communication. For the latter, it seems that reference must somehow be tied 
to certain psychological states of speakers, in particular to their dispositions 
to produce and interpret expressions in certain ways and to revise their usage 
systematically in light of new information. 
 Just consider a population like the EAs in the experiment reported by Machery 
et al. and assume that their judgements (formed in response to the probe) reveal 
their dispositions to use and interpret proper names and that these dispositions 
don’t align with the semantic facts. 13 In that case, whenever the causal-historical-
theory and the descriptivist theory make distinct predictions about the referent 
of a proper name in an utterance, the content communicated by the utterance 
(i.e. the content intended to be communicated and the content received) would 
be systematically diff erent from the content assigned to the utterance by the true 
theory of reference (in this case, the causal-historical theory). It seems that the 
semantic properties ascribed by the theory of reference to the utterance tokens 
would be irrelevant to any explanation of how the content in question got 
communicated via the utterance. But what would be the point of such a theory? 
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 On the basis of these considerations, the following defi nition of reference is 
suggested in (Cohnitz and Haukioja 2013):
 Reference: A token expression E refers in language L to object O iff  (i) E is 
standing in the R-relation to O and (ii) competent speakers of L are disposed to 
interpret objects (of the type of O) to be the referents of expressions (of the type 
of E), if they believe these are connected by the R-relation. 
 If we follow this suggestion (assuming that the causal-historical theory is the 
correct fi rst-order theory), then a certain token of the name ‘Angela Merkel’ 
refers in English to the person Angela Merkel because Angela Merkel is at the 
other end of a causal-historical chain that leads up to the usage of that token, and 
speakers of English are disposed to interpret persons as the referents of proper 
names, if they believe that a name-token and a person stand in such a causal-
historical relation. 
 Of course, speakers of English (unless they are particularly nerdy linguists 
or philosophers of language) do not form any beliefs about the exact causal-
historical relations in which people stand to linguistic expression-tokens. What 
is required is that their usage, including their dispositions to correct their usage, 
is sensitive to information that happens to be about the causal-historical chain 
in question. 
 Th us, when confronted with a Gödel/Schmidt-case, we are disposed to 
interpret John’s usage of the name “Gödel” as referring to the man who stole 
the manuscript when we learn the facts about the causal historical chain, rather 
than to interpret him as referring to Schmidt, the man who in fact proved 
the incompleteness of arithmetic. We are sensitive to information about the 
causal-historical chain in our interpretation dispositions rather than sensitive 
to information about the beliefs a person happens to have concerning the 
(purported) bearer of a name. We don’t need to think at any point about any of 
this in terms of the R-relation, and so on. 
 Meta-Internalism is a theory about the subject matter of theories of reference 
and thus about the facts that determine which theory of reference is true. 
According to Meta-Internalism, these are facts about certain dispositions of 
competent speakers. Th erefore, if we want to know which theory of reference 
is true, we should try to get information about those facts. Th at we should 
endorse Meta-Internalism rather than Meta-Externalism is grounded in our 
epistemological aim; we are interested in a theory that can make a systematic 
contribution to an explanation of linguistic communication. A Meta-Externalist 
theory doesn’t seem to be fi t for the job. 
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 However, some authors who would agree that this is the role of theories of 
reference and that these are the facts that determine which theory of reference is 
true still disagree with the idea that in testing intuitive responses to hypothetical 
cases in philosophy of language we are studying the relevant intuitions. As 
explained in Section 2, Genoveva Martí believes that thought experiments in 
philosophy of language elicit meta-linguistic intuitions. But for all that is said 
so far, such intuitions shouldn’t be very relevant for determining the truth about 
reference. In the next section we will consider whether Martí is right: what are 
the relevant intuitions in philosophy of language, and which intuitions are tested 
with Gödel/Schmidt-type thought experiments? 
 4. Semantic Intuitions 
 Let’s consider a concrete example: the Gödel/Schmidt case described above and 
a hypothetical utterance (U) of John:
 (U) Gödel was a brilliant mathematician. 
 What does “Gödel” refer to in this utterance? Th at’s the kind of question that 
is typically raised in thought experiments in philosophy of language. A typical 
answer would be 
 (A) In John’s utterance (U), “Gödel” refers to the man who stole the manuscript 
and claimed credit for the work. 
 In this case, what is the ‘intuition’? An intuitive interpretation of the hypothetical 
utterance by John that we arrived at thanks to our linguistic competence? Or is 
it instead a spontaneous meta-linguistic judgement concerning the expression 
‘Gödel’ that we arrived at on the basis of our everyday experience with the 
usage of proper names by competent speakers of English? Michael Devitt and 
Genoveva Martí claim that it is the latter (and thus that it is of little value for 
semantic theorizing). For example, in response to the experimental work by 
Machery et al., Genoveva Martí off ers the following response:
 I think if we focus on the type of data that [the probes used by Machery et al.] 
are collecting, the ‘semantic intuitions’ that they elicit, we can see that the 
responses are not the kind of data that constitutes the input, the raw data that 
the semanticist relies on in order to start theorizing. Participants in the probes 
are told a fi ctional story about a community of speakers . . . Participants are 
then asked to hand down a judgement as to what the referent of a use of a 
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name by a hypothetical speaker member of the fi ctional community is. So, the 
participants are asked to tell us how they think the hypothetical speaker in 
question, and the rest of his community, uses names. Is that the evidence that 
we should rely on to construct a semantic theory? I think the answer is no. 
(Martí 2014, p. 22) 
 According to Martí, these intuitive judgements that are elicited by thought 
experiments like the Gödel case only inform us about how people think that 
they use language, but not about how they actually use language, and it is only 
the latter that matters for the semanticist. Th erefore, the only real evidence that 
matters in linguistics and philosophy of language is data about use, collected by 
observing the theoretician’s own linguistic behaviour and that of the linguistic 
community around her. A judgement like (A) at best informs us about the 
theoretical preferences of the test subjects:
 Th e Gödel story invites a refl ection on use, it does not collect data on use; it 
is, hence, a theoretical tool, and Kripke uses it as such. And the responses of 
subjects to the Gödel story will, at best, tell us what theory they are disposed 
to fi nd more natural as an explanation of how the hypothetical speaker, or they 
themselves, use language. But what theory people are more disposed to accept is 
not the input of the theory itself. (Martí 2014, p. 23) 
 But how do we know that a judgement like (A) is a theoretical judgement rather 
than evidence of a relevant bit of language use? How do we know that a response 
like (A) informs us at best about which theory of reference a speaker is disposed 
to favour rather than about how she is disposed to interpret an utterance like 
(U)? 
 Martí seems to think that this is obvious from the way the probe is phrased 
(at least she doesn’t seem to off er any other evidence). Doesn’t the question who 
John is talking about or the question to whom “Gödel” refers in (U) require 
refl ections on use because, aft er all, these are questions about how another 
person uses a name? 
 Th is would be right only if interpretation wasn’t part of use. But it obviously 
is. Linguistic competence with proper names isn’t only a matter of producing 
sentences with proper names in the right way. It’s also a matter of interpreting 
the use of proper names in the sentences of others. Presumably production and 
interpretation are just two sides of the same coin. Th erefore the fact that the 
question asked in the probe concerned the utterance of a third person does not 
itself establish that the probes were collecting anything other than the relevant 
‘raw data’. 
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 However, there seem to be two other considerations that speak in favour of the 
view held by Martí and Devitt. First of all, (A) is a meta-linguistic sentence, since 
it obviously speaks about language. Th e sentence contains the word “Gödel” in 
quotation marks, thus the sentence is (at least in part) about the word “Gödel”. 
Furthermore, the sentence contains an expression from semantics (“refers to”). 
Th erefore it seems plausible to think this sentence, inasmuch as it expresses a 
judgement, expresses a meta-linguistic judgement. 
 However, according to Devitt (2006), meta-linguistic judgements are 
independent of our linguistic competence. Th ey are ordinary judgements 
that we arrive at on the basis of experience and background-knowledge (in 
this case, our experience with the way in which proper names are typically 
used by speakers of English and background knowledge we might perhaps 
have about linguistics and theories of reference). Th e only diff erence between 
these judgements and others is that the former are made with much greater 
spontaneity than the latter. 
 In (Cohnitz and Haukioja forthcoming) this view is discussed in some 
detail. Th ere it is argued that we need to distinguish, fi rst of all, between the 
results of dispositional competences and their reports. When we interpret an 
utterance in a context of utterance, we interpret the utterance and its component 
expressions intuitively. We are basically doing the same when interpreting 
(U) in the hypothetical context described above. What enables us to arrive at 
such interpretations, is our linguistic competence in English. Under certain 
conditions, we might also be able to report the results of such interpretations. 
What is required is that (a) the result is available to our consciousness, and (b) 
we master the concepts and expressions required for making such a report. If 
both, (a) and (b) are in place, we are able to report our intuitive interpretation of 
(U) and, in particular, our interpretation of the expression “Gödel” in (U), using 
the sentence (A). 
 In the case of semantic interpretations, i.e. our understanding of utterances and 
their parts, it seems plausible to assume that the results of these interpretations 
are available to consciousness. Aft er all, these results, that is, our interpretations 
of what our interlocutors say in their utterances, enter into our inferences about 
what our interlocutors think and plan. 
 It also seems plausible that we master the relevant concepts and terms 
required to report our interpretations. Conversation about what other people 
have said and about whom they have said things forms a huge part of our 
everyday communication. Th us requirements (a) and (b) seem to be met for 
semantic interpretations. 
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 Th is is already an important result. What seemed to speak in favour of the 
view championed by Devitt and Martí was that (A) was a metalinguistic sentence 
because (A) was about the word “Gödel” and (A) included semantic vocabulary. 
As we have seen now, whether (A) expresses a metalinguistic judgement in their 
sense is not so much a question of what the sentence is about but rather a matter 
of what cognitive process leads to the judgement expressed. As we have seen 
now, (A) could simply be a report of our intuitive interpretation of (U). 
 (A) could also be the result of a diff erent cognitive process; namely the one 
described by Devitt and Martí. In this case we’d have a dispositional competence 
to make generalizations about the reference of expressions based on our 
observations of the usage of proper names in English. Th is acquired competence 
would allow us to make judgements about (U) that we’d report with sentences 
like (A). 
 In both cases, in reporting the intuitive interpretation or the metalinguistc 
judgement, it is possible to make mistakes. In the case of metalinguistic 
judgements, even if the judgement was reported without mistake, the 
methodological value and relevance of such judgements for the philosophy of 
language and linguistics depends on how good we are at making generalizations 
about linguistic usage based on our everyday experience. One can probably 
follow Devitt and Martí in thinking that this value is not very high. 
 For reports of intuitive interpretations, things look diff erent. If the report is 
accurate and there are no other reasons to assume that our interpretation was 
not produced by our linguistic competence, then (A) is not only relevant for 
philosophy of language, but it reports the kind of facts that constitute the very 
subject matter of theories of reference. 
 But besides the observation that (A) is a meta-linguistic sentence, Devitt 
(2011) has a second argument for the claim that (A) expresses a meta-linguistic 
judgement that doesn’t report the output of linguistic competence but instead 
something independent of it. Devitt cites empirical evidence from developmental 
psychology that we acquire the relevant meta-linguistic concepts relatively late 
in our cognitive development and that we are able to make judgements like (A) 
only a considerable time aft er we have already acquired (otherwise) complete 
linguistic competence. 
 But here Devitt overlooks the fact that this result is entirely compatible with 
the Meta-Internalist view. Of course, it might well be the case that it is only 
relatively late in our linguistic and cognitive development that we are able to 
report our semantic interpretations or parts of them with sentences like (A). 
But this doesn’t provide us with any reason to doubt the view that these reports 
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are reports of the outputs of our linguistic competence rather than reports of an 
independent observation of our linguistic environment. For example, the ability 
to visually recognize certain objects in our environment precedes our ability to 
report what we have recognized. Th e same could easily hold for our ability to 
report outputs of our linguistic competence. 
 Th us, there remains nothing that would speak in favour of Devitt’s and 
Martí’s view that the intuitive judgements that serve as evidence in philosophy 
of language are spontaneous judgements based on linguistic experience. Instead, 
these judgements are plausibly reports of the interpretation-outputs of linguistic 
competence. 
 However, the fact that Devitt and Martí misunderstand these judgements and 
their proper content is still cause for concern. If there are two distinct processes 
that can both lead to utterances of (A), and if philosophy of language should 
really only be interested in one of them, then there is at least the danger that the 
data (judgements of the form of [A]) are ambiguous. How are we supposed to 
know that test-subjects would judge that (A) is true on the basis of their linguistic 
competence, if even experts like Devitt and Martí misunderstand the task? 
 Moreover, it was speculated above that the reliability with which sentences 
like (A) report interpretations of sentences like (U) depends in part on how 
entrenched the relevant metalinguistic concepts and terms are in the idiolect of 
the test-subject. Perhaps philosophers of language are better at reporting such 
interpretations than the ordinary folk that Machery et al. tested. 
 As was said in the beginning, there is also the further problem that (A) can 
be ambiguous in a second way when it comes to the evaluation of the Gödel/
Schmidt-case. It was argued that there might be an ambiguity between the 
semantic referent of “Gödel” and the speaker referent of John’s utterance. In the 
next section we will look at ways to get around these two problems by refi ning 
the standard methodology of philosophy of language. 
 5. How philosophy could learn from psycholinguistics 
 Let us fi rst consider possible solutions to the problem of how we could fi gure 
out which cognitive process has in fact lead to a certain judgement.  Prima facie 
one might think that we are faced with a methodological dilemma. We want 
to know how competent speakers understand a hypothetical utterance. But we 
can’t just look into their heads, so we need to ask them how they understood 
it. However, as we have just seen, those questions and their answers seem to 
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be meta-linguistic in the sense that these questions or judgements are about 
linguistic expressions and in addition make use of semantic vocabulary. Doesn’t 
that lead unavoidably to our methodological problem; namely, that we don’t 
know whether the test person informed us in her answer about her semantic 
interpretation (which is what we are interested in), or rather about what her 
lay-theory of proper name reference predicts for this case (which we don’t care 
much about)? 
 Luckily, this isn’t a real dilemma. First of all, we could investigate the 
interpretations we are interested in without asking the test subjects. For example, 
we could investigate them indirectly by observing the later behaviour of the test 
subjects, in particular in situations in which relevant diff erences in interpretation 
would lead to observable diff erences in behaviour. From that, one might be able 
to infer, under appropriate circumstances, the information (if any) that the test 
subject extracted from an utterance – either about the world or the speaker. 
 Of course, it would be even better if we didn’t need to use such an indirect 
methodology (i.e. one that might introduce new ambiguities). In fact, it is 
indeed possible, at least when it comes to reference, to study the interpretation 
of linguistic expressions directly. To see how this could be done, we need to look 
at psycholinguistics and the methods used therein to investigate the resolution 
of referring expressions. 
 When psycholinguists investigate, for example, the resolution of anaphoric 
reference, they oft en use eye-trackers, that is, instruments that allow 
experimenters to track the eye-movement of a test subject. Initially this method 
was used to see how eyes move in reading-comprehension tasks. For our 
purposes, the more interesting work in psycholinguistics is that performed in 
studies described by Karabanov et al. (2007). In these experiments, test-subjects 
are confronted with two stimuli: the auditory stimulus is a spoken text (which 
contains in this case anaphoric pronouns) and a visual stimulus, in our case a 
picture of a pseudo-natural market-day situation built up with Playmobil TM toy 
characters. 
 In the experiment described by Karabanov et al. (2007), the linguistic stimulus 
was the following German sentence:
 Heute ist Markt im Dorf. Die Marktfrau streitet mit dem Arbeiter. Sie sagt jetzt 
gerade, daß er kein’ Ärger machen und das neue Fahrrad zurückgeben soll, 
das er sich geliehen hat. [It’s market day in the village. Th e market woman is 
quibbling with the worker. She’s just saying that he should not make any trouble 
and should give the new bike back that he borrowed.] (Karabanov et al 2007, 
p. 211) 
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 Th ere are several theories about the resolution of pronouns that diff er with 
respect to the postulated cognitive processes involved in their interpretation. For 
example, the theory of Morton Gernsbacher (1989) assumes the interpretation of 
anaphoric pronouns to be a two-step process. First the antecedent of the pronoun 
is identifi ed and then, in a second step, the connection to the referent of the 
antecedent is established. Th e theory by Lorraine Tyler and William Marslen-
Wilson (1982), however, holds that pronouns are immediately interpreted 
referentially, just like full lexical NPs or proper names. Th is diff erence in 
postulated cognitive processes should (or, in any case, might) lead to empirically 
testable diff erences: on the view suggested by Gernsbacher the interpretation of 
an anaphoric pronoun would seem to require more time than the interpretation 
of a full lexical NP, while on Tyler and Marslen-Wilson’s theory, the resolution of 
an anaphoric pronoun should take as much time as that of a full lexical NP. 
 In the eye-tracking experiment by Karabanov et al., it is assumed that eye-
movement (or more specifi cally, the probability by which the eyes of the test-
subject will fi xate on a certain point in the visual scene) is directly correlated with 
the interpretation of a heard linguistic item. Th at makes it possible to compare 
the times it takes for the fi xation probabilities for a certain item in the visual fi eld 
to increase and relate these times to the type of expression interpreted. Does it 
take longer for the fi xation probability for the referent of an anaphoric pronoun 
to increase than it does for the referent of a full lexical NP? Karabanov et al. 
found no time diff erence (which they took to speak in favour of the theory by 
Tyler and Marslen-Wilson). 
 Th is empirical result itself is (for our purposes) not so interesting. What 
is interesting about this experiment is the fact that we can use eye-trackers to 
measure the interpretation of referential expressions without having possible 
problematic metalinguistic considerations taint the data. Our eye-movements 
are involuntary and automatic. Th e causally relevant cognitive process is that of 
interpreting the sentence. Other potential infl uences (like the relative salience of 
an object in the visual fi eld) can be controlled for in the experiment. 
 Th at way we possess at least one instrument for measuring the interpretation 
of referential expressions by competent speakers that is immune to Devitt’s 
methodological worries. Philosophers of language could make use of this tool in 
two ways. First, one could test theories of reference directly on test subjects, given 
that these theories make diff erent predictions about the referent of an expression 
(under certain contextual circumstances). Th is would presuppose that diff erent 
theories of reference always make diff erent predictions that can be turned into 
measurable tasks. Th is, presumably, is not always the case. However, we could use 
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this methodology also for the calibration of our ordinary armchair methodology. 
Devitt’s worries aren’t automatically relevant when cognitive processes other 
than linguistic interpretation lead to the metalinguistic judgements in question. 
Th ey are only relevant if these other cognitive processes would lead to diff erent 
judgements. If it could be shown that our judgements about the reference of 
a term in a hypothetical utterance and our interpretations as measured by the 
eye-tracker coincide with high reliability, then Devitt’s worries should be simply 
irrelevant. 
 Th e method described could also be helpful in a second sense. We said above 
(when discussing objection 2.2 against the experiment by Machery et al.) that 
the responses to the Gödel/Schmidt-probe suff ered from a second ambiguity. 
Consider again the relevant test questions:
 When John uses the name “Gödel”, is he talking about: (A) the person who really 
discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic? or (B) the person who got hold of 
the manuscript and claimed credit for the work? 
 It was ambiguous whether the question is about who John intends to refer to 
with his usage of ‘Gödel’, or instead about who John in fact and objectively refers 
to with that term. 
 Indeed, in a later experiment, Justin Sytsma and Jonathan Livengood showed 
that intra-cultural 14 variation disappears when the fi nal question is changed to 
the following:
 Clarifi ed Narrator’s Perspective: Having read the above story and accepting that 
it is true, when John uses the name “Gödel”, would you take him to actually 
be talking about: (A) the person who (unbeknownst to John) really discovered 
the incompleteness of arithmetic? Or, (B) the person who is widely believed 
to have discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic, but actually got hold of 
the manuscript and claimed credit for the work? (Sytsma and Livengood 2011, 
p. 324) 
 Th e amount of B-answers increased from 39.4 per cent (for the original question 
that was used in the study by Machery et al. 2004) to over 73 per cent for the 
‘clarifi ed narrator’s perspective’. Th is suggests that the variation detected by 
Machery et al. (at least the intra-cultural one) was due to the ambiguity in 
perspective in the fi nal question. 
 However, even the clarifi ed narrator’s perspective contains a residual 
ambiguity. If I know that John believes that Gödel proved the incompleteness 
of arithmetic and know that John is good at mathematics and knows nothing 
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else about Gödel, then I might think that John intends to (and does) talk about 
the guy who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. In order to eliminate this 
ambiguity one could rephrase the question, using precise semantic vocabulary, 
thereby again increasing the probability for tainting the data with metalinguistic 
considerations. 
 Perhaps the eye-tracking methodology described above could help us also 
here. 15 As Keysar, Lin and Barr (2003) report, the pragmatic interpretation of 
an utterance, which takes into account the perspective and knowledge of the 
speaker/interlocutor, is delayed in comparison to the literal interpretation of an 
utterance. In one of their experiments, a test situation was arranged such that 
the test subject (the participant) and a second person (the confederate) were 
sitting at opposite sides of a table. Th e test subject could see more items on the 
table than the other subject and was aware that she could see those other things 
and that the other person didn’t even know these other things were on the table. 
Nevertheless, when tracking the eye-movements of the participant, it turned out 
that the fi xation probability for those hidden objects increased fi rst when they 
were better candidates for being the semantic referents of the expressions used 
by the confederate, while the fi xation probabilities for the speaker referents was, 
by comparison, delayed. 
 For example, in one instance of such an experiment the participant was asked 
to secretly hide a roll of tape in a paper bag and to store it at a location visible 
to her but invisible to the confederate. However, there was a cassette visible to 
both the confederate and the participant. While monitoring the eye-movements 
of the participant, Keysar, Lin and Barr found that in many cases in which the 
confederate instructed the participant to ‘move the tape’, the eye-movements of 
the participant revealed that she had fi rst interpreted the referent of “the tape” to 
be the best semantic candidate (the hidden roll of tape in the box) rather than the 
only possible speaker referent (the mutually visible cassette). Th e interpretation 
of “the tape” as having the intended (speaker) referent occurred with a time 
delay. 
 Th ese results suggest that eye-tracking can be used to discriminate between 
speaker reference and semantic reference, again without involving any 
problematic meta-linguistic questions or judgements. Th is interpretation also 
seems to be consistent with more recent experiments reported in Barr (2008), 
which show that although listeners in a conversation expect speakers to refer to 
objects in the common ground (accessible or visible to both), they are unable to 
reduce interference from ‘privileged competitors’, that is from better semantic 
referents that are not in the common ground (Barr 2008). Again, this suggests 
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that eye movement is primarily responsive to semantic interpretation (and 
only with a delay, is it responsive to the pragmatic integration of knowledge of 
common ground). 16 To be clear, this interpretation of the experimental results, 
although consistent with them, hasn’t been tested yet (as far as I know). But 
if this hypothesis holds up, then eye tracking would provide us with a further 
method to study the relevant ‘raw data’ (to use Martí’s expression) at the level of 
interpretation in a more reliable way than the usual method wherein test subjects 
are asked to report their interpretations of hypothetical utterances. 
 6. Conclusions 
 We have seen that, if certain assumptions are made about the explanatory aims 
of philosophy of language and about the nature of reference as it should feature 
in those explanatory aims, we can investigate philosophical methodology and 
arrive at recommendations for an improved methodology. We then know what 
we need to examine, how we could check the reliability of our methods, and 
consider improvements. 
 However, the assumptions we started from, (viz. the idea that theories of 
reference should systematically contribute to explanations of successful linguistic 
communication) and the consequences these had for Meta-Internalism, are 
specifi c to this particular sub-area of philosophy. Perhaps they are even specifi c 
to this area of philosophy of language. Th ere might well be another inquiry into 
‘reference’, which doesn’t start with a primary interest in communication but 
perhaps with a primary interest in representation, or perhaps information, and 
such a project might encumber diff erent methodological commitments. 17 
 However that may be, it should be clear that one can’t just generalize the 
methodological insights here described to all other areas of philosophy without 
fi rst proving that the same assumptions we made about theories of reference also 
hold for these other areas. As I tried to explain in the introduction,  prima facie , 
there is currently no reason to think that they do. 
 Notes 
 *  I would like to thank Alex Davies, Jussi Haukioja and Edouard Machery for helpful 
comments on an earlier version of this text. Research for this chapter was supported by 
the following research grants: SFLFI11085E, ETF9083, SF0180110S08 and IUT20–5. 
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Some of the ideas presented here are discussed in somewhat more detail in Cohnitz 
2014, and a lot of it is based on work that was carried out with Jussi Haukioja, as with 
our (2013) and (forthcoming). However, the present chapter contains a more careful 
discussion of Genoveva Martí’s recent criticism of experimental philosophy (Martí 
2014) and further suggestions pertaining to how empirical methods could be put to use 
in philosophy of language. Th us readers familiar with the arguments in this earlier work 
can fast-forward to Sections 4 and 5. 
 1  Although the notion itself seems to be a rather recent invention, and the discussion 
has developed systematically only in the past decade, PhilPapers, the most 
comprehensive index and bibliography of philosophy, already has a top-level 
category “Metaphilosophy”. 
 2  Of course, there have always been metaphilosophical contributions and 
discussions. Another unfortunate aspect of the discussion in the past decade is that 
it appears not to be informed by what has been written on the subject before that 
decade. 
 3  Even if we restrict – as I do throughout the chapter – philosophy to analytic 
philosophy. 
 4  In this chapter, the focus will be on the discussion of the methodological value of 
intuitions that resulted from this chapter. For an overview of the development of 
experimental philosophy of language in general, see Genone (2012) and Hansen 
(forthcoming). 
 5  Cf. Stich (in preparation). 
 6  Cf. Machery et al. (2013) for a response. 
 7  Cf. Machery (2012) for a response. 
 8  Cf. Machery et al. (2009) for a response. 
 9  Cf. Machery et al. (forthcoming) for a response. 
 10  Of course, the Meta-Externalist view might also be compatible with the reliability 
of our intuitions, if we assume that we are suffi  ciently attuned to the linguistic 
facts. However, in light of the empirical results, the Meta-Externalist would at least 
have reason to doubt that we (or, in any case, lay speakers) are suffi  ciently attuned. 
Th anks to Edouard Machery for pressing me on this. 
 11  See Schwarz (2013) for a discussion of such views. 
 12  Th e term was introduced in Schwarz (2013). 
 13  On that account, what we should say about the cultural variation found in the study 
by Machery et al. (2004) is that the Ws get it largely right how proper names work, 
while the EAs get it largely wrong. 
 14  However, the inter-cultural variation could be replicated. Cf. Sytsma et al. 
(forthcoming). 
 15  I owe the idea that eye-tracking could be used for distinguishing speaker and 
semantic referent to Manuel Garcia-Carpintero. 
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 16  A curious fi nding by Wu and Keysar (2007) is that, apparently, listeners from a 
Chinese background (when listening to Chinese) show less interference from 
privileged referents than listeners from an English-speaking American background. 
Th is is curious, because it would be consistent with the original fi ndings in 
Machery et al. 2004 and could perhaps (partly) explain the found cultural variation. 
 17  I don’t think that that’s in fact the case for reference. But it seems to me that the 
fact that Devitt’s thinking about linguistic meaning departs from considerations 
about how we can extract information about the world from linguistic items, 
rather than from considerations about how we manage to communicate with 
language, explains to some extent why he believes that we can study linguistic 
reality in ignorance of the psychological basis of reference (cf. Devitt and Sterelny 
1999). 
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